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THE CHILDREN OF SCIENCE:
PROPERTY, PEOPLE OR SOMETHING IN BETWEEN?
by
Star Lopez
INTRODUCTION
How should states classify embryos?  The war has often waged between two classifications, 
people versus property.  But what if a state assumed something in between, finding the embryo to be a 
potential person entitled to special respect?  If a state adopted this position, how would the law affect 
medical research?  Consider the following scenarios:   
1. During in vitro fertilization (IVF), physicians cultivate excess embryos that are frozen to be used in
future pregnancies. 1
2. Several embryos are cultivated for IVF, but once one is successfully implanted, the others are 
destroyed.
3. An IVF patient donates her surplus of embryos to an infertile couple.
4. An IVF patient donates her surplus of embryos to medical research.2
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 David I. Hoffman, Gail L. Zellman, C. Christine Fair, Jacob F. Mayer, Joyce G. Zeitz, William E. Gibbons, and 
Thomas G. Turner, Jr., Cryopreserved Embryos in the United States and their Availability for Research, 79 
FERTILITY AND STERILITY 1063 (2003).
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5.  Researchers gather stem cells from a regular embryo that has inherent potential to develop into a 
baby.3
6. Researchers harvest stem cells from a cloned embryo that is capable of surviving past birth.4
7.  Researchers take stem cells from a single cell of an eight-cell embryo that may or may not be able to 
survive birth.5
8.  Researchers collect stem cells from a cloned embryo that lacks the capacity  to implant in the womb 
and develop into a human baby.6
While the use of embryos in medical research has consistently proven controversial, recent 
medical advances, including single cell biopsies and alternative nuclear transfer (ANT), call for a 
reconsideration of the embryo and its value in human society.  Some individuals contend embryos 
constitute complete persons while others maintain that embryos merely equate property.  However, the 
American Society for Reproductive Medicine (ASRM) has consistently classified embryos not as persons, 
but merely as potential human beings worthy of special respect.7 Similarly, the United States government 
has regarded an embryo as something less than a human person. 8
Although the debate over embryonic status has generally been framed as person versus property, 
the issue may be more accurately defined as the embryo constituting neither person nor property, but a 
potential person due special respect.  Those who attribute personhood to the embryo contend that embryos 
2
 Ethics Committee of the American Society for Reproductive Medicine, Donating Spare Embryos for Embryonic 
Stem-Cell Research, 82 FERTILITY AND STERILITY S224, S225 (2004).
3
 Donald W. Landry and Howard A. Zucker, Embryonic Death and the Creation of Human Embryonic Stem Cells,
114 JOURNAL OF CLINICAL INVESTIGATION 1184 (2004).
4 NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL AND INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE, GUIDELINES FOR HUMAN EMBRYONIC STEM CELL 
RESEARCH 28 (May 2005).
5
 Young Chung, Irina Klimanskay, Sandy Becker, Joel Marh, Shi-Jian Lu, Julie Johnson, Lorraine Meisner & 
Robert Lanza, Embryonic and Extraembryonic Stem Cell Lines Derived from Single Mouse Blastomeres, NATURE 
LETTERS, October 16, 2005.
6
 Alexander Meissner and Rudolf Jaenisch, Generation of Nuclear Transfer-Derived Pluripotent ES Cells from 
Cloned Cdx2-Deficient Blastocysts, NATURE 1 (2005), available at 
http://www.nature.com/nature/journal/vaop/ncurrent/abs/nature04257.html.
7 Ethics Committee of the American Society for Reproductive Medicine, supra note 2.
8 Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 870 (1992).
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ought to share in the rights afforded to all people, including unalienable rights of life and liberty. 9 On the 
other hand, people who think of embryos as mere cells, lacking in personhood, believe that an embryo 
does not warrant any rights whatsoever.  Even so, the ASRM and courts, such as that in Davis v. Davis, 
have found embryos to constitute potential persons owed special respect.10 Individuals who regard 
embryos as potential persons believe that the embryo lacks the requisite individuality for complete human 
rights yet is entitled to due consideration, or special respect.11
Presuming embryos constitute potential persons, the debate continues with how to define “special 
respect.” The status of a potential person runs along a spectrum between property and personhood.  How 
one defines “special respect” determines where the potential person falls along this spectrum.  Special 
respect creates a spectrum of treatment that extends from a property-like limitation of ownership rights to 
something resembling rights afforded to an absolute person.  
Currently, without the protection of a person’s human rights, embryos may be dissected, 
discarded, and donated.  Effectually affording embryos special respect, the legislature currently prohibits 
their sale and limits their use in experimental research to embryos that have developed for 14 days or 
less. 12 This rendition of special respect seems to define the potential person as closer to the property end 
of the spectrum where one treats an embryo as property that offers a limited bundle of rights, i.e. some but 
not all ownership rights.  The embryo donor retains a “bundle of rights,” including the right to use, 
possess, destroy, or alienate by donation.13 However, the owner is denied a single stick of the bundle,
alienability by sale.
On the other hand, one might characterize special respect as something analogous to limited
human rights, identifying the potential person more closely to a person than property.  In effect, one might 
find that an embryo holds a right to life but lacks entitlement to other traditional rights and liberties.  
9 Ethics Committee of the American Society for Reproductive Medicine, supra note 2; See also DECLARATION OF 
INDEPENDENCE [¶ 2] (1776).
10 Id. at S224; See also Jennifer Hodges, Comment, Thursday <CSQ> S Child: Litigation over Possession of 
Cryopreserved Embryos as a Call for Legislation, 40 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 257, 263-64 (1999).
11 Ethics Committee of the American Society for Reproductive Medicine, supra note 2, at S224.
12 Ethics Committee of the American Society for Reproductive Medicine, supra note 2; George P. Smith, II, Assisted 
Noncoital Reproduction: A Comparative Analysis, 8 B.U. INT'L L.J. 21, 36 (1990).
13 See generally STEPHEN R. MUNZER, A THEORY OF PROPERTY 15 (1990).
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Weighing these two interpretations of a “potential person” entitled to “due respect,” society may prove 
more amenable to regarding an embryo as a person with limited rights.  
This comment contends that potential personhood may, and perhaps should, result in treating an 
embryo more like a person afforded limited rights as opposed to property offering its owner a limited 
bundle of rights.  Treated as a person with limited rights, the embryo would retain a right to potential life.  
Such treatment would also preserve human dignity and prevent the commodification of human life.
In this comment, we theorize about the impact of a state that statutorily regards an embryo as a 
potential person.  Such a statute may assert that embryonic material with the active potential to develop 
into a live born offspring, if positioned in the uterus of a woman, is a potential person due special respect 
that parallels the most fundamental human right to life.14 In other words, special respect would afford the 
potential person a right to its potential life.  Such a right draws into question the common practice of 
destroying embryos in IVF and stem cell research.
Part I assesses the current perception of embryos as persons, potential persons afforded due 
respect, and property.  Part II discusses the potential insufficiency of characterizing embryos as persons 
and property.  Part III analyzes various interpretations of the potential person classification, including 
property that offers its owner a limited bundle of rights and persons who possess limited rights of their 
own.  Part III also explains the value of treating embryos as more akin to persons than property. Part IV 
reflects on the implications that regarding an embryo as a person with limited rights would have upon 
medical technology.  This includes an analysis on IVF, a consideration of traditional techniques for 
culturing stem cell lines, and an assessment of the most recent medical advances in deriving embryonic 
stem cells.
14 R. ALTA CHARO, Every Cell is Sacred: Logical Consequences of the Argument from Potential in the Age of 
Cloning, in CLONING AND THE FUTURE OF EMBRYO RESEARCH 85 (P. Lauritzen, ed.  2000) (distinguishing between 
active and passive potential).
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PART I:
THREE ACCEPTED CLASSIFICATIONS
FOR HUMAN EMBRYOS
Generally, people have classified human embryos in one of three different categories, (1) a 
person, (2) property, or (3) a potential person afforded “special respect.”  This last category serves as a 
middle-ground between person and property.  Each of these characterizations create different implications 
for the treatment of embryos.  Hence, courts, religious groups and scientists have all struggled with how 
to characterize an embryo.  To better understand the debate, one must familiarize herself with the 
meaning and implications of each classification.
A.  An Embryo as a Person
Generally, characterizing an embryo as a person entitles the embryo to the same rights and 
protections afforded to a fully viable, “living and breathing” human being.15  Those who ascribe to this 
view typically consider life to begin at fertilization and consider the status of a person to take effect at 
such time.16  Others believe the status of personhood takes effect 14 days after fertilization.17  At this 
point, the embryo gains individuality and will no longer twin or regress into a nonviable state.18
While some people in general society ascribe to the characterization of embryos as persons, 
religious groups, such as the Catholic Church, have also adopted the view that embryos constitute people, 
sacred human life worthy of preservation.19  The Church believes that from the moment of conception
embryonic life has a right to protection. 20 As an institution, it goes so far as to label the destruction of an 
15 Ethics Committee of the American Society for Reproductive Medicine, supra note 2.
16 Id.
17 Id.
18 Id.
19
 Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith, Roman Catholic Church, Instruction on Respect for Human Life in its 
Origin and on the Dignity of Procreation: Replies to Certain Questions of the Day 5, available at
www.vatican.va/roman_curia/congregations/cfaith/documents/rc_con_cfaith_doc_19... (last accessed May 24, 
2005).
20 Id.
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embryo as an “abominable crime.”21  Hence, being a powerful organization, it condemns research on live 
embryos unless the experiment will not compromise the embryo’s life or integrity.22 This ban on 
embryonic destruction proves consistent with the common sentiment among groups that consider 
embryos to be persons.  These groups afford the embryo fundamental human rights, including a right to 
life.  
B.  An Embryo as Property
On the other hand, some groups believe that the embryo comprises mere property.  They have no 
qualms with research that damages the integrity of an embryo and precludes its further development into 
an eventual human being.  Rather, these groups focus their attention on the property rights belonging to 
the gamete donors, i.e. genetic parents of the embryo.  This position has also extended to reasoning used 
in case decisions.  For instance, to determine the fate of a divorced couple’s cryopreserved embryos, the 
appellate court in Davis v. Davis concentrated its reasoning on the parties’ property ownership rights as 
gamete donors.23 As one of the popular characterizations for embryos, the property theory gives wide 
latitude for the use of embryos in in vitro fertilization and stem cell research.
C.  An Embryo as a Potential Person Afforded Special Respect
Between the personhood and property theories, lies the depiction of an embryo as a potential 
person afforded special respect.  This theory asserts that researchers must treat an embryo with more care 
than that applied to mere property, because it has an inherent capability to develop into a human being.24
Still, the potential personhood theory falls short of classifying the embryo as a full person and entitling it 
to all human rights and liberties.25
21 Id.
22 Id.
23
 Hodges, supra note 10, at 267-268.
24 Ethics Committee of the American Society for Reproductive Medicine, supra note 2.
25 Id.
- 8 -
Some theorists, such as Peter Singer and Deane Wells, criticize the potential personhood 
classification as being overly inclusive, since a separate sperm and egg have equal potential to develop 
into a person as long as left unimpeded.26  However, this comparison fails.  A sperm or egg by itself will 
never develop into a fetus and live offspring.  Even a sperm and egg within range of each other will not 
form an independent life form, unless the sperm manages to break through the outer wall and fertilize the 
egg.  Rather, for bodily tissue to acquire the inherent capacity for independent life, a chemical reaction of 
fertilization must take place to set the developmental process in motion.  
The implication of the potential personhood theory depends on how one defines “special respect.”  
The American Society for Reproductive Medicine (ASRM) and other groups have adopted the potential 
personhood theory.27  Even IVF patients who have cryopreserved their excess embryos can empathize 
with consid ering them potential persons.  In a study, 80 percent of IVF patients were inclined to think of 
their embryos as a potential child.28  Effectually, the ASRM and many IVF patients characterize embryos 
as potential people worthy of special respect.
However, acceptance of the potential personhood theory by the ASRM and IVF patients holds
different implications for each group.  The ASRM finds that special respect allows for embryonic 
research so long as it will likely provide new knowledge benefiting human health.29 Regardless of the 
benefits that embryonic research may offer, IVF patients who thought of their embryos as potential 
children exhibited apprehension over donating their embryos for research.30  One can likely attribute these 
two different perspectives on embryonic research to the groups’ varying degrees of special respect that
they afford to the embryo as a potential person.
26
 Charo, supra note 14.
27 Id.
28
 A. McMahon, Frances L. Gibson, Garth I. Leslie, Douglas M. Saunders, Katherine A. Porter, and Christopher C. 
Tennant, Embryo Donation for Medical Research: Attitudes and Concerns of Potential Donors, 18 HUMAN 
REPRODUCTION 871, 874 (2003).  McMahon et al.  conducted an experiment consisting of questionnaires distributed 
to 509 couples who had stored frozen embryos.  152 women (30%) responded.  123 (24%) male partners responded.  
All subjects had embryos stored for 3 months to 12 years.  The study demonstrated that few IVF couples were 
inclined to donate their embryos for research.  Only 10% of the subjects said it is was probable that they would 
donate surplus embryos for research.  34% said it was merely possible that they would donate surplus embryos for 
research.  Those with negative views tended to consider embryos as potential children.
29 Ethics Committee of the American Society for Reproductive Medicine, supra note 2.
30
 McMahon, supra note 28, at 871.
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PART II:
INSUFFICIENCY OF CHARACTERIZING AN EMBRYO
AS A COMPLETE PERSON OR MERE PROPERTY
A.  Arguments Against Personhood
Personhood entitles one to “certain unalienable Rights, … [including] Life, Liberty and the 
pursuit of Happiness,”31 and other constitutional rights, such as the right to vote, the right to bear arms,
the right to a speedy trial, and other rights.32 Though groups of people have widely adopted the 
personhood theory for embryos, “the unborn have never been recognized in the law as persons in the 
whole sense.”33  Many people rely on a tangible threshold and define personhood on the basis of birth.  
However, the theory for embryonic personhood generally requires that fertilization or individuality signal 
the onset of life.  
Some supporters of embryonic personhood may contend that the embryo is a person immediately 
upon fertilization due to the embryos inherent capacity to develop into a live born human being.  
Similarly, other supporters use the fourteenth day after fertilization as the dividing line for personhood 
since the embryo only then achieves individuality.34  Prior to the fourteenth day, embryos remain capable
of (a) dividing to become twin fetuses or (b) merging with another fertilized oocyte to form a single baby 
that is a mosaic of genetic patterns.35  The only real difference between these two points in development, 
fertilization and individuality, is that the latter waits to decipher greater specificity in the embryo’s 
potential.   Still, both seem to rely on the embryo’s inherent capacity for live birth in order to assert 
personhood.  
Opponents contend that capacity for live birth remains insufficient for tissues to qualify as a full 
person.  Since only around 40 percent of all fertilized eggs implant and complete their development, 
31 DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE [¶ 2] (1776).
32
 U.S. Const. amend.’s II, VI, IX, XV, XIX.
33 Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 162 (1973).
34 Charo, supra note 14, at 84.
35 Id.
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characterizing every one of them as a full person would constitute a logistical nightmare.36 Beyond the 
issue of practicality, most people do not consider these miscarried embryos as complete human beings.  
Traditionally, the developmental threshold for a person has been birth, the point at which a fetus can 
thrive outside the womb.  
On the other hand, human beings are “always in a state of evolution toward perfection of [their] 
potential.”  Still , no matter their developmental stage, they always qualify as people.  For instance, despite 
some social innuendos, a teenage human being is no less of a person than a forty year-old adult.37
However, the embryo’s capacity to develop and survive past birth better supports classifying the embryo 
as a potential person rather than a complete person.  Even proponents of embryonic personhood rely on 
birth as a deciding factor, since they only attribute personhood to human cells with an inherent capacity 
for developing into live offspring.  In which case, it may remain most appropriate to define an embryo as 
a potential person, which is one with potential to develop into a born human being and worthy of special 
respect.
B.  Arguments Against Property
In the case of embryos construed as property, the theory does not correspond with human dignity 
and general social sentiment.  Preserving human dignity, the United States government and general 
society reject the commodification of humanity, which is exemplified by the U.S. ban on slavery.  Human 
tissue also holds unique value over other inanimate objects due to its strong correlation to human persons.  
Though human tissue is not a person, the United States government prohibits the transfer of human 
organs for direct payment in order to preserve the dignity of mankind.38  While such regulation limits a 
person’s ownership rights over her own body parts, it also reduces the commodification of human tissue 
and implicitly protects the value of humanity.
36 Id.
37 Id. at 85.
38 Ethics Committee of the American Society for Reproductive Medicine, Financial Incentives in Recruitment of 
Oocyte Donors, 74 FERTILITY AND STERILITY 216 (2000).
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Although people have some ownership rights over their body parts like the right to transfer 
organs by donation, an embryo proves distinct and even worthier of additional consideration.  Unlike 
most body parts and tissue samples, an embryo has the capacity to develop into an independent human 
being.  Not even a gamete cell, the building block for an embryo, can develop into a separate person on its 
own.  This potential for independent human life gives the embryo a deeper connection to personhood.  In 
which case, treating an embryo as mere property that can be bought, sold, and destroyed creates an assault 
on human dignity, demeaning the importance of human life.  
Recognizing this problem, society has cautiously abstained from classifying an embryo as simple 
property, but instead has given the embryo additional consideration.  Even opposing political parties have 
acknowledged this sentiment.  Both Republicans and Democrats have treated human embryos with 
respect greater than that due typical property.  While property owners have a right to destroy their own 
property, both parties have hesitated in condoning a human embryo’s destruction.39
Initially, Congress enacted a broad ban on federal funding for human embryonic stem cell 
research.40  As for the Democratic Party, the 1999 Advisory Committee recommended that the 
government fund both derivation and use of hES cells from spare, donated embryos.  Derivation of hES 
cells requires the destruction of a human embryo and its capacity to develop into a viable human being. 41
Upon this recommendation, the Clinton Administration hesitated in condoning embryonic destruction and 
proposed to fund only the use, not derivation, of hES cells.42
In 2001 before grants were made, the Republican Bush administration limited consideration of 
funding to not only the use of hES cells, but also to cell lines derived and cultured before August 9, 
2001.43  This regulation adopted the theory that the government may condone the medical benefit of stem 
39
 Ethics Committee of the American Society for Reproductive Medicine, supra note 2, at S224.
40
 Landry, supra note 3.
41
 Ethics Committee of the American Society for Reproductive Medicine, supra note 2, at S224.
42 Id.
43 Id.
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cell research so long as it does not cause harm to embryos.44  Aside from refusing to fund the derivation 
of human stem cells, the Bush administration intentionally abstained from providing further incentive for 
future hES cell derivation.  This inter-party sentiment toward embryonic destruction, alongside the 
interest of preserving human dignity, further amplifies the inadequacy of characterizing embryos as 
property.
44
 A. Robertson, Causative vs. Beneficial Complicity in the Embryonic Stem Cell Debate, 36 CONNECTICUT LAW 
REVIEW 1099, 1104 (2004).
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PART III:
A HYBRID APPROACH OF
POTENTIAL PERSONS DUE SPECIAL RESPECT
A.  Two Different Interpretations of “Special Respect”
According to the potential personhood theory, an embryo is a potential person deserving of 
special respect.  However, this characterization of an embryo remains open for interpretation.  While 
accepting that the embryo constitutes a potential person, groups differ on how to construe “special 
respect.”  The spectrum extends from a property-oriented interpretation to a person-oriented 
understanding.  This comment contends that one may most commonly define special respect as either (1) 
property-oriented with a restriction of the gamete donor’s property rights or (2) person-oriented affording 
an embryo that which reflects a person’s most fundamental rights.  
To discern the most appropriate meaning of “special respect,” we should ask whether the 
potential person most closely reflects (1) property or (2) person. If a potential person most closely reflects 
property, then special respect would focus on the property owner’s rights and simply restrict these rights 
to enhance use and perhaps increase the property’s preservation.  On the other hand, when one closely 
associates potential personhood with actual personhood, special respect will focus on the embryo’s 
interests.  Though a potential person does not share all the rights and liberties of an actual person, an 
embryo’s interests may resemble limited interests akin to some of the most fundamental rights afforded a 
full human being.
As an example of due consideration that restricts an owner’s property rights, the ASRM has 
adopted the view that an embryo is a potential human being worthy of special respect.45  However, the 
ASRM finds embryonic research ethically permissible if it will likely provide new knowledge benefiting 
human health.46  This treatment of embryos most closely mirrors that of property, such as an animal.  
45
 Ethics Committee of the American Society for Reproductive Medicine, supra note 2.
46 Id.
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Researchers often use animals for research purposes that may lead to their extermination.  In a like 
manner, so long as it is for the greater good, the ASRM allows the researcher to terminate an embryo.  
Contrary to this notion, society considers human life invaluable and would generally not condone killing 
a fully viable human being for new knowledge.  On the other hand, society will limit an owner’s property 
rights for the sake of advancing medical comprehension.47  Adopting a property-oriented definition of 
potential personhood, the ASRM limits the owner’s use of the embryo, rejecting the notion of an 
embryo’s rights and further commodifying the use of an embryo.
When one takes on a person-oriented understanding of the potential person, the embryo’s interest 
takes priority.  For instance, many IVF patients also find themselves inclined to view embryos as 
potential persons worthy of special respect.48 Still, this group of patients generally disagrees with 
donating embryos for medical research.49  Effectually, the IVF patient seems to associate potential 
persons more closely with an actual person than with property.  A person-oriented understanding of 
potential personhood often causes the individual to afford the embryo special respect by attributing to it a
human’s most fundamental rights.  Although a potential person does not have all rights and liberties of an 
actualized person, the person-oriented understanding would provide it with the most fundamental human 
right, the right to life.  In order to employ any other right or liberty, a person must, first and foremost, be 
alive.  If potential personhood resembles personhood more so than property, then special respect would at 
the very least preserve the embryo’s potential for life.  
B.  The Advantages of Embryos as Persons With Limited Rights
Although special respect may be interpreted in two different manners, the person-oriented 
construction best serves the public interest of holding human life in high regard.  Since it has not yet 
undergone birth and achieved viability outside the womb, the embryo falls short of actual personhood.  
47 Moore v. UC Regents, 51 Cal.3d 120, 140-141 (1990) (finding California statutes to limit patient’s interest in 
excised cells, giving the state rights to destroy anatomical parts, human tissues, human remains, or infectious waste).
48 McMahon, supra note 28.
49 Id.
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Still, it has the inherent capacity to develop into a live born human being.  With human embryos having 
such a close relation to humanity, our treatment of them symbolizes the value of human life.  
Applying special respect that affords the embryo a right to its potential life demonstrates that, no 
matter the degree of potential actually achieved, human life always holds great significance.  In a like 
manner, the disabled and minors, although currently born, fail to achieve the full potential of human
abilities or faculties.  Though we sometimes limit their rights and freedoms,50 we still regard them as 
persons with protected rights.51  Treating these individuals as anything less than a human being would 
devalue human life in general.
Adopting the person-oriented view of a potential person and interpreting special respect as a 
limitation on gamete donor’s property rights would fail to acknowledge an embryo’s unique capacity for 
life.  Even the ASRM admits that embryos constitute more than human tissue.52 Because human tissue 
and organs are property with a limited bundle of rights,53 the ASRM’s definition would mean that the
embryo is more than property offering its owner a limited bundle of rights, i.e. more than the property-
oriented definition of special respect.  
The property-oriented view of potential personhood and special respect also violates public policy 
by commodifying humanity.  Because society so greatly values human life and seeks to preserve this high 
regard, the government has prohibited the commodification of people through slavery.  While the 
prohibition of slavery prevents the commodification of actual persons, the government has extended this 
preventative measure to property closely associated with humanity.  For instance, a person may not
transfer human tissue for direct payment.54 Though such measures are in part due to an attempt to protect 
the donor from health risks, they are also intended to discourage the commodification of actual persons by
50
 The fact that a person cannot vote until she reaches the age of majority exemplifies a restriction placed on a 
person’s constitutional rights when she is a minor.  Furthermore, in a majority of states, a disabled person who is 
found legally incapacitated and assigned a guardian loses her right to vote.  Joan L. O’Sullivan, Role of the Attorney 
for the Alleged Incapacitated Person, 31 STETSON L. REV. 687, 693 (2002).
51
 For instance, Congress has passed the Americans with Disabilities Act to protect the rights and freedoms of 
certain disabled people.  See 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (2006).
52 Id. at 871.
53
 Ethics Committee of the American Society for Reproductive Medicine, supra note 38.
54 Id.
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giving consideration to material closely related to human life.  Because embryos share a significant 
connection to fully viable people, treating them as something akin to property would imply that people 
may be reducible to mere commodities and undermine the preservation of human dignity.
Despite the advantages and disadvantages of these two constructions, this comment simply 
addresses the implications of defining an embryo under the person-oriented definition.  The next section 
will offer a discussion of how the scientific community has used embryos in medical advancements and 
research.  Although many of the resulting ethical concerns hinge on when life begins, the analysis will 
focus on the consideration of embryos as potential persons with protected interests and the legal 
implications of such regard.
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PART IV:
SCIENTIFIC IMPLICATIONS
Since the federal government has generally remained unwilling to regulate the disposition of 
embryos prior to implantation, the states have the discretion to statutorily govern the use of these 
organisms.55  In this analysis, we shall presume that the state has statutorily defined embryos as potential 
persons and affords the embryos special respect, i.e. protection of their capacity for life.
A.  The Science Itself:  Medical Technologies of Yesterday and Today
To understand the scientific use of embryos, one must understand the structure and development 
of the embryo itself.  Basic components necessary for the derivation of an embryo include two cells, the 
egg and sperm.  The egg cell, also known as an oocyte, derives from the female parent.  The male parent 
provides the sperm cell.  For an embryo to form, the sperm must fertilize the oocyte.   Once this chemical 
reaction occurs, the embryo commences development.  
Initially, a fertilized oocyte results in a single-celled zygote. 56  This zygote divides to create an 
embryo. 57  After three or four days of division, the embryo is deemed a morula and has 16 to 32 cells.58
Five to six days after fertilization, the embryo reaches the blastocyst stage and contains 200 to 250 cells.59
The blastocyst has an outer layer of cells called the trophectoderm,  a fluid-filled cavity known as the 
blastocoel, and a cluster of cells in its interior termed the inner cell mass (ICM).60  While the 
trophectoderm creates the placenta, the ICM creates the embryonic disk and eventually the fetus.61  On 
55 Karen Kaplan, No Embryos Lost to New Stem Cells, LOS ANGELES TIMES (October 17, 2005), available at 
http://www.latimes.com and http://www.stemcellnews.com/articles/stem-cells-no-embryos-lost.htm (last accessed November 28, 
2005)(providing an example of California legislation that provides for embryonic stem cell research with state funds).
56 NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL AND INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE, supra note 4, at 24.
57 Id.
58 Id.
59 Id.
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day six, the blastocyst implants in the uterus and the inner cell mass begins differentiation to create 
embryonic tissue layers for the fetus. 62
While in utero fertilization has served as the natural reproductive process for many years, the 
scientific community has recently made significant advances in reproductive technology, in some cases 
changing the fundamental nature of an embryo.  Scientists have used these technological advances in 
various ways, from helping infertile couples bear children to studying and treating bodily disease.63  The 
following will give a brief introduction to these scientific techniques and their practical value to society.
i.  In Vitro Fertilization
In the 1970’s, scientists developed a procedure called in vitro fertilization (IVF).64  IVF makes 
reproduction possible for infertile couples, who have low sperm motility, fail to produce ova, or have 
physical damage to the fallopian tube or uterus.65  IVF allows an infertile couple to bear a child 
genetically related to them.  Rather than adopting, people with infertility problems may beget a child of 
their own.66 The general process requires (1) extraction of the gamete cells, (2) fertilization of the oocyte 
in vitro, and (3) implantation of resulting embryos into the uterus.67
To extract the necessary oocytes, scientists most commonly use ultrasound transvaginal 
extraction, a non-surgical procedure.68  Sedating the donor, the physician punctures a needle through the 
vaginal wall into the ovaries and extracts follicular fluid which contains the desired oocytes.69  Although 
ultrasound transvaginal extraction is the least invasive method, it proves more difficult and results in 
fewer oocytes than other surgical procedures.70
62 Id.
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64 IVF, BBC NEWS – HEALTH MEDICAL NOTES (March 31, 1999), available at 
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accessed November 27, 2005).
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Upon extracting the follicular fluid, the embryologist locates the oocytes and fertilizes them by 
one of two methods, microdroplet or ICSI fertilization.71  In microdroplet fertilization, the embryologist 
mixes the oocyte with 150,000 to 225,000 sperm cells, allowing them to penetrate the oocyte on their 
own.72  When male infertility remains a factor, ICSI requires the embryologist to manually inject a single 
sperm cell into the oocyte.73  During and after fertilization, the embryologist maintains the embryos in 
laboratory dishes that simulate the environment in utero.74  Once fertilized, the resulting embryo will 
divide two or three times prior to implantation. 75  At which point, the physician transfers the cultured 
embryos into the patient’s or surrogate’s uterus via catheter.76
Although this may seem like a straightforward procedure, it creates far more ethical and medical 
complications than one might anticipate.  First of all, IVF often results in the creation of excess embryos 
outside the womb.77  In case the initial set of embryos fail to implant, this surplus is cryopreserved and 
later used to repeat the procedure.78 Throughout the world, thousands of embryos have been 
cryopreserved.79  At the end of 2000, Australia alone had 71,776 cryopreserved embryos.80 As of April
2002, the United States had nearly 400,000 embryos in storage, 81 and this number increases on a daily 
basis.  
Though most people store their embryos for use in future IVF procedures, these surplus embryos 
will often exceed the number of embryos necessary to fulfill the couple’s reproductive needs.82  These 
embryos share an equal potential to implant in the uterus and develop into a live born offspring.  
However, when the couple’s fertility needs are met, the couple may decide between (1) donating the 
71 In Vitro Fertilization (IVF-ET), GEORGIA REPRODUCTIVE SPECIALISTS (2005), available at http://www.ivf.com/ivffaq.html (last 
visited November 27, 2005); See also Andrology University of Utah Clinical Services: IVF (2001), available at 
http://uuhsc.utah.edu/andrology/clinical_services_2.html (last accessed November 27, 2005).
72 Andrology University of Utah Clinical Services: IVF, supra note 71.
73 Id.
74 In Vitro Fertilization (IVF-ET), supra note 71.
75 Id.
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embryos for biomedical research, (2) donating the embryos to another infertile couple, or (3) discarding 
the embryos entirely.83  Similarly, a couple may elect between one of these three options in case of death, 
divorce or no further contact with the clinic.84  Hence, IVF procedures may often result in the disposal of 
a human embryo that has the inherent capacity to develop into a live born baby if given an opportunity to 
implant within a uterus.
Additionally, IVF procedures are costly and endanger the oocyte donor.85  IVF procedures can 
range from $8,800 to a little under $50,000 for gestational surrogacy.86  Furthermore, oocyte donation 
procedures create risks for the donor.  Risks to third party oocyte donors include both physical87 and 
psychological burdens, as well as unintentional pregnancy due to discontinued use of contraceptives.88
More extreme risks include disease, remote mortality, impaired fertility, and psychological consequences 
from waiving parental rights and future contact with resulting children.89 Pre-existing IVF patients may 
endure even more risks, including insufficient oocytes for the patient’s own purposes and a psychological 
83 Id.; See McMahon, supra note 28, at 872; See also Bernard Lo, Vicky Chou, Marcelle I. Cedars, Elena Gates, Robert N. 
Taylor, Richard M. Wagner, Leslie Wolf, and Keith R. Yamamoto, Informed Consent in Human Oocyte, Embryo, and Embryonic 
Stem Cell Research, 82 FERTILITY AND STERILITY 559-63 (2004).  Lo identifies the options that IVF patients in California have in 
deciding what to do with their excess embryos.  Currently, California law requires clinics to offer four options for unused 
embryos, (1) donating the embryo for medical research, (2) donating the embryo for implantation for another individual, (3) 
discarding the embryo and allowing it to succumb, (4) storing the unused embryos.
84
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85 Fertility Evaluation and Procedures, THE FERTILITY INSTITUTES (2005), available at http://www.fertility-
docs.com/fertility_fees.phtml (last accessed November 27, 2005).
86 Id.
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induction therapy used in IVF.  Practice Committee of the American Society for Reproductive Medicine, infra note, 
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over timing of ovulation.  Hodges, supra note 10, at 260.  Superovulation is a means of producing multiple eggs, 
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oocyte retrieval in ART cycles.  Practice Committee of the American Society for Reproductive Medicine, supra note 
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Minor Symptoms of OHSS include lower abdominal pain, diarrhea, mild nausea, vomiting, and abdominal 
distension.  Id. at S82.  As the illness progresses, the donor may exhibit rapid weight gain and difficulty breathing.  
Id.  In terms of life threatening complications, OHSS may cause kidney failure, adult respiratory distress syndrome, 
hemorrhaging from an ovarian rupture, and thrombembolisms.  Id.  Where OHSS symptoms exist, cryopreservation 
of in vitro embryos may be necessary to defer transfer and decrease the risk of developing severe OHSS symptoms.  
Id.  Recurring in half of the women undergoing gonadotropin-induced superovulation cycles, OHSS remains a 
serious risk to oocyte donors in IVF procedures.  Id. at S84.
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burden if she remains childless while another couple raises her biological offspring.90  Moreover, a pre-
existing IVF patient who donates her oocytes may bear an increased risk of physical harm from added egg 
retrieval. 91
Other factors, including research and financial incentive, may further exacerbate the physical and 
psychological risks to gamete donors.  Incentive to help in medical research may cause donors to subject 
themselves to more oocyte retrievals than necessary and further exacerbate dangers, such as Ovarian 
Hyperstimulation Syndrome.92  Furthermore, compensation for research participation is common and 
tends to exacerbate the harm to oocyte donors.93  Financial incentives for oocyte donation include 
monetary payment to third party donors and reduced fees for IVF patients who consent to harvesting 
excess oocytes for donation purposes.94  The monetary benefits to research subjects may provide incentive 
for donation or simply compensate for risk, time, and inconvenience.95
Even when intended as mere compensation, monetary benefits may prove extraordinarily high.  
By 1999, the compensation extended from $2,500 to over $50,000.96  In fact, entrepreneurial couples may 
pay relatively large amounts of $50,000 or more for oocyte donations from women with specific 
characteristics and intellectual abilities.97  On the other hand, IVF patients who donate excess oocytes 
have been known to receive 50 to 60 percent reduction in IVF cycle expenses.98
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 Because no standard guidelines exist for recruitment and compensation among medical research 
organizations, compensation may result in “uncertain safeguards against unfair or coercive payment.”99
Monetary incentive may induce people to make donations despite a serious risk of harm without full 
consideration of all the risks and benefits.100  Excessively high compensation further exacerbates this 
problem and preys on the economically deprived.101  High monetary payment encourages women, 
especially women with little money to ignore the risks involved in oocyte donation.102  For instance, 
college newspapers like The Daily Bruin of UCLA advertise compensation ranging from $5,000 to 
$10,000 for “a few eggs.”103  Such amounts would cover a student’s tuition for a full year.  Hence, one 
might expect an impoverished student to discount the risks of the invasive surgery for one more year’s 
tuition.104  Recognizing this problem and attempting to reduce its impact, some organizations limit 
monetary bonuses to low-risk follow-up visits.105
Such compensation may also infringe on human dignity when the payment exceeds the value of 
time and energy spent by the oocyte donor.  Payment may imply a commodification of human genetic 
material.  Since gametes are the primary elements for embryo production, financial incentive for gamete 
donors raises a serious concern that commodifying human gametes may eventually lead to objectifying 
embryos and, later, human life.  Although U.S. law prohibits the transfer of human organs for direct 
payment,106 this indirect payment for gametes likely exceeds what oocyte donors would be recompensed 
for hourly time and effort.107  Thus, the monetary payment seems to provide consideration for the oocytes 
themselves, violating human dignity by implicitly putting a price on human body parts.
Overall, IVF remains one of the many advances that the scientific community has made in the use 
of embryos.  While it offers significant advantages to infertile couples, IVF also entails problematic 
99
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considerations that range from imperiled oocyte donors to the disposal of potential persons and an affront 
on human dignity.  Other innovative scientific techniques give rise to similar and, in some cases, more 
severe concerns.
ii. Embryonic Stem Cell Research
Aside from use in reproductive procedures, scientists also utilize embryos in culturing embryonic 
stem (ES) cells.  In the 1980s, scientists first derived ES cells from mouse blastocysts.108  The first culture 
of human ES (hES) cells took place in 1994.109  ES cells are primitive, undifferentiated cells taken from 
the ICM of an embryo blastocyst.110  Due to their pluripotent nature, ES cells can differentiate into all 
body cell types, which provide potential for advancement in therapeutic medicine.111  However, extracting 
hES cells from the blastocyst requires the destruction of the human embryo, which renders hES cell 
research controversial.112
On August 9, 2001, President Bush announced that the government would only fund research on stem 
cells derived from an embryo created for reproductive purposes prior to August 9, 2001 and donated for 
research without financial inducement.113  Nonetheless, only 20 of these ES cell lines have proven usable,
and, out of these 20 lines, all were cultivated on mouse cell feeder layers, which render them imperfect 
for full therapeutic use.114  To better serve regenerative medicine, the therapeutic medical community 
aims to produce hES cells cultivated on human feeder layers.115  However, this requires the destruction of 
additional embryos that have the ability to produce live born offspring. 116  Hence, without federal 
funding, private organizations and individual states continue to fund stem cell research that results in the 
108 NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL AND INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE, supra note 4, at 24.
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termination of further embryos.117  For instance, in 2004, California citizens passed Proposition 71, which 
provided 3 billion dollars for stem cell research.118 Despite this private and state funding, scientists 
continue to seek out new, more effective, and ethically acceptable techniques for culturing hES cells.  
a. Traditional ES Cell Culture
Typical stem cell extraction begins with immunosurgery that removes the embryo’s 
trophectoderm, which is the blastocyst’s outer layer of cells.119  Then, the ICM located within the 
blatocoel is disaggregated and implanted on feeder cells.120 In isolating the ICM, scientists extinguish the 
embryo’s pre-existing capacity to develop into a live born human being.121  Researchers use the ICM to
obtain homogenous cell colonies.122  Finally, the scientists screen the colonies for stem cells and harvest 
them for use in medical research.123
Embryonic stem cells serve as important therapeutic tools in regenerative medicine.124  Since hES 
cells are self-renewing and scientists can induce them to differentiate into any tissue type, they may be 
used to study genetic illness and create methods in overcoming tissue rejection.125  For instance, scientists 
may modify hES cells to reduce a person’s immune response to tissue transplants, increasing the 
probability that the patient’s body will accept the transplant.126  Hence, society has a great interest in 
accumulating genetically diverse hES cells, so that stem cell research may benefit people of all genetic 
backgrounds.127
However, traditional hES cell cultures require the production of embryos much like that in IVF.  
In fact, the main source of embryos for ES cell research comes from the surplus embryos created in IVF 
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procedures.128  Consistent with the very nature of their creation, these embryos have the potential to 
develop into live born human beings.  As a result, hES cell research involves many of the same concerns 
over human dignity and health risks to gamete donors.  To obtain the necessary embryos, ES cell research 
requires oocyte donors to undergo some psychological and physical risks.  Even more, in order to extract 
hES cells, scientists must destroy the human embryo and its ability to develop into a live born 
offspring.129  Despite these problems, the scientific community forges on in stem cell research in hopes of 
improving regenerative medicine.
b.  Somatic Cell Nuclear Transfer (SCNT)
Extending their research to stem cells that duplicate the genetic makeup of existing individuals, 
scientists developed Somatic Cell Nuclear Transfer (SCNT), also known as “cloning.” In 1997, Ian 
Wilmut at Roslin Institute in Scotland achieved nuclear transfer by starving a cell into a reproductively 
agreeable state and injecting it’s nucleus into an enuclearted egg. 130  As a result, Dolly the Sheep, the first 
mammal clone, came into being.131  In early 2005, Dr. Hwang Woo Suk of South Korea claimed to have
derived human ES cells via SCNT.132  However, late that year, it was found that Hwang had fabricated his 
discovery. 133 The Herald Tribune called it the “most sensational case of scientific fraud in recent 
history.”134
The SCNT process produces an embryo-like organism, called an embryoid, which is an exact 
genetic match to a currently viable being.135  Instead of fertilizing an oocyte with a sperm cell, a 
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researcher electrically shocks the nucleus of a specialized cell, such as a skin cell.136  Then, the researcher 
injects the nucleus into the cytoplasm of an enucleated oocyte.137  Finally, the egg is activated to divide 
and form a blastocyst that replicates the genetic makeup of the nucleus donor.138
Similar to a traditional embryo, the resulting embryoid has the inherent potential to implant in the 
uterus and to develop into a live born person.139  However, these offspring often exhibit abnormalities.
Cloned mammals have a low survival rate and most do not survive past birth.140  In fact, those that survive 
exhibit significant genetic defects, such as large offspring syndrome.141  Large offspring syndrome results 
in respiratory and metabolic abnormalities as well as an enlarged and dysfunctional placenta.142  Even if 
abnormalities fail to appear at birth or younger ages, cloned offspring have shown signs of defective 
metabolisms and pathological alterations in organs.143  Likewise, the first cloned mammal, Dolly the 
sheep, died prematurely exhibiting pathological abnormalities.144
Achieving both therapeutic and reproductive cloning, SCNT marks significant advances in 
medical research.  By therapeutic cloning, nuclear transfer permits the collection of ES cells that 
genetically mirror existing people or animals.145  Like traditional ES cells, these cells self-renew and can 
differentiate into most mature body cells.146  Hence, SCNT would theoretically allow scientists to produce 
exact tissue matches for a patient in need of a transplant.147  It even provides a means by which 
researchers can study the cause, development and effects of a donor’s complex genetic disease.148 SCNT 
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also opens the door to reproductive cloning, the creation of a live born baby that shares its exact genetic 
makeup with an already existing person.149
While SCNT would offer significant scientific advantages, it still entails potential ethical and 
practical problems.  Like ES cell cultures from a regular embryo, SCNT involves fatal damage to an 
embryoid with the ability to develop into a live born offspring.150  In addition, SCNT not only threatens 
the commodification of human life by financial solicitation of oocytes, but it also devalues the human 
individual by making genetic copies of an already existing person, particularly through reproductive 
cloning.  “With larger numbers comes the possibility of declining regard” for the genetic individual.151
c. Single Cell Biopsy of Eight-Cell Embryo
As a solution to some of the ethical concerns that stem cell research invites, scientists at 
Advanced Cell Technology in Worcester, Massachusetts developed the single cell biopsy of an eight-cell 
embryo, a new technique for culturing hES cell lines.152 The single cell biopsy method imitates an IVF 
procedure used to diagnose an embryo for any of 150 genetic defects.153  Researchers allow an embryo to 
divide three times over the course of two days after fertilization.154  Once the embryo reaches eight cells, 
a researcher divides it into two, plucking one cell from the embryo and allowing the other seven cells to 
continue developing.155   This dissection occurs immediately before the embryo transforms into a 
blastocyst.156 After extracting the single blastomere, researchers surround the blastomere with hES cells 
to induce it into behaving like a human stem cell.157
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Stem cells produced via single cell biopsies offer the same medical advantages in therapeutic 
medicine as ES cells taken from a regular embryo.158  Researchers may use these cells to create 
replacement cells in case of disease.159  However, stem cells retrieved by single cell biopsy are limited to 
the genetic makeup of blastomeres extracted prior to birth.160  In other words, this single cell biopsy does 
not permit the culturing of stem cells that share the genetic makeup of an already existing person.161
Furthermore, since it may still utilize surplus embryos from IVF, the procedure does not solve the risks 
posed to oocyte donors.
Some contend that this single cell biopsy redresses the concern of embryo destruction that arises 
in traditional hES cell extraction.162  Allowing the other seven embryos to continue developing, this 
procedure attains human stem cells without destroying the original embryo.163  Theoretically, this allows 
researchers to show due respect to embryos as potential persons by allowing them to continue 
development and possibly survive past birth.164  However, a major reservation about the single cell biopsy 
method is whether or not researchers fail to show due respect by experimentation on the single 
blastomere.165  If the single cell blastomere can develop into a live born offspring on its own, then the 
method may still undermine human dignity and fail to show special respect to the potential person.
d. Alternative Nuclear Transfer (ANT)
Looking for a more versatile method that would provide a therapeutic benefit to born individuals 
and would appease ethical considerations, scientists recently developed a new form of stem cell extraction 
called alternative nuclear transfer.  William Hurlbut, a Stanford professor and a member of President 
Bush’s Council on Bioethics, first proposed the idea in response to a demand for stem cell research that 
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required more sophisticated stem cells than that funded under Bush’s 2001 legislation.166  Hurlbut
proposed alternative nuclear transfer, a method that derived stem cells from an entity that is inherently 
unable to develop into a live born human being.167
Just recently, Meissner and Jaenisch, researchers from Whitehead Institute for Biomedical 
Research and MIT, made this theory into a reality, discovering a procedure to achieve ANT.168  By 
suppressing cdx2 expression in the nucleus injected into the oocyte, the researchers created an embryoid 
inherently incapable of developing into a human offspring.169  The cdx2 gene codes for trophectoderm 
development. 170  Without cdx2, the embryoid lacks the capacity to develop placenta in the early stages of 
embryo growth.171  Unable to develop placenta, the embryoid cannot develop past the blastocyst stage.172
Still, researchers can derive pluripotent stem-cell lines from the embryoid’s ICM.173  Like 
classical ES and NT cell lines, these pluripotent cell lines can form several kinds of mature cells.174
Although capable of generating most tissues, ANT ES cells that lack cdx2 expression cannot generate 
intestinal tissue.175  Nonetheless, when researchers reactivate cdx2 expression in the stem cell, the cell can 
produce all somatic tissues, including intestinal tissues.176  ANT stem cell extraction currently works on 
mice cells and would theoretically apply to human embryos, as well.177
As a result, this procedure would offer a new source for harvesting fully human ES cells without 
destroying a potential person.  Since the embryoid biologically cannot implant, it lacks the potential for 
live human birth.  Hence, dissection for ES cultures would not inhibit the embryoid’s capacity for human 
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personhood.  Furthermore, unlike ES cells obtained from single cell biopsies, ANT stem cells may share 
an identical genetic makeup to that of an already existing patient.178  Essentially, ANT stem cells offer the 
same possibilities for therapeutic medicine as does SCNT cloning without obstructing potential life.  Even 
better, ANT does not raise the SCNT ethical concern of devaluing human life by reproductive cloning.  
Since the ANT embryoid inherently cannot implant, it cannot achieve reproductive cloning.  However, 
the risks on donors continue to persist under ANT, as well as the potential for commodifying genetic 
human material, such as oocytes.
B.  Regulating the Science in Light of the Potential Person
Considering the various functions and implications of each of these procedures, we must next 
consider how an embryo’s status as a potential person and right to special respect affects the 
appropriateness of these practices.  Since life, as opposed to death, is generally considered to be in the 
best interest of a human being,179 the United States Constitution identifies life as a fundamental right 
possessed by every person.180  This comment assesses the impact of states classifying embryos as 
potential persons entitled to special respect.  Presuming that the state adopts a person-oriented 
understanding of potential personhood, the state will afford the embryo special respect akin to the most 
fundamental human rights, including a person’s right to life.  Hence, a state adopting a person-oriented 
approach to potential personhood will likely show due respect by preserving an embryo’s potential for 
life.  In other words, the state would prohibit any use of an embryo that eliminates its inherent ability to 
mature into a living human being. 
ii.  In Vitro Fertilization (IVF)
IVF creates embryos with the potential to implant and grow in the patient’s womb but often 
results in the production of more embryos than required by the patient’s reproductive needs.181  Consistent 
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with their intended use, these embryos have the inherent potential to implant and develop into a live born 
human baby.182  However, many patients fail to implant all of their excess embryos.183  When patients 
divorce, die, or simply fulfill their reproductive needs, they have one of three options (1) donating their 
embryos to research, (2) donating their embryos to another couple, or (3) discarding the embryo 
entirely.184
Although donating one’s embryos for another couple to implant allows the embryo to actualize its 
potential, inconsistency with the potential personhood theory arises in disposing of the embryo and 
possibly donating the embryo to medical research.  Discarding the embryo and allowing it to succumb 
essentially destroys the embryo as well as its potential to grow into a live offspring.  Similarly, research 
may require the dissection of an embryo to the point where it loses its ability to implant in the uterus and 
develop into a living baby.  In which case, such donation would violate the underlying rule of prohibiting 
procedures that destroy an embryo’s potential for life.  Even more, some contend that creating excess 
embryos for destruction and experimentation immorally exploits the embryo as “disposable ‘biological 
material.’” 185 Such exploitation runs contrary to the special respect due to a potential person, and should 
not be allowed.
Others would contend that the mere cryopreservation as opposed to immediate implantation 
exposes embryos to a risk of harm and temporary deprivation of maternal shelter and gestation.186
However, this comment does not extend its position to that length, since special respect ought to reflect 
the most fundamental of human rights and must not be abused as a free-for-all of protection.  Unlike 
destruction, potential risk of harm and temporary deprivation of opportunity to gestate does not 
conclusively deprive the embryo of the opportunity to develop into a live born human offspring.  Even so, 
182 Id.
183 Id.
184 Id.; McMahon, supra note 28, at 872.
185
 Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith, Roman Catholic Church, supra note 19.
186 Id.
- 32 -
an excessive number of surplus embryos that couples cryopreserve still pose a grave problem where 
couples complete their treatment and do not want any more children.187
Hence, a state that has adopted potential personhood should limit the number of embryos 
produced to the amount that a couple is willing to implant.  In fact, the state ought to require patients to 
construct an alternative plan of adoption for each unused embryo created in the procedure.  This ensures 
implantation, giving each potential person a reasonable opportunity to develop into a live-born offspring.  
On another note, this does not limit the number of oocytes cultured but may potentially reduce the number 
of oocytes needed if the embryologist intends to fertilize fewer eggs.
Others might contend that limiting the number of embryos produced unfairly disadvantages 
patients whose first set of embryos fail to implant.  Cryopreserved embryos that a patient may use later 
are less likely to result in pregnancy than freshly-cultivated embryos.188  Also, any further extraction 
procedures may prove too expensive for patients to afford.  Patients may argue that this risk justifies 
cryopreserving more embryos than one intends to bear.  However, these contentions do not defeat such 
regulation.  Instead, patients may cultivate excess eggs and sperm then freeze them for later fertilization.  
In case a patient wishes to have more embryos than she anticipated, she may fertilize her excess eggs to 
create as many embryos as she decides to immediately bear.  In case she cannot bear every embryo 
produced, again she should have alternative parents at her disposal to carry and raise the child.  
Furthermore, patients may protest having to make a choice between bearing children that they do 
not want and giving their embryos to adoptive parents.189  However, limiting the number of embryos 
produced to the number that the patient is willing to raise reduces the severity of this problem, since the 
patient would have weighed these considerations in advance.  If she does not wish to donate her embryos, 
she may simply limit the amount that she creates and store excess oocytes and sperm for later fertilization, 
in case she decides to bear more children.
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As IVF procedures typically require informed consent, it would place a minimum burden on 
clinics to require that the couple stipulate the disposition of excess embryos prior to the procedure.190
Similar to how some recommend a physician discuss donation with the patient at the initiation of any 
advanced fertility treatment,191 the physician should also discuss the number of children that the patient 
desires to bear and with whom the patient would want any surplus embryos placed.  In case the patient 
ends the treatment early, her alternative appointment or consent to donation will ensure that the embryo 
has an opportunity to develop and fully achieve its potential for live birth.
In order to show an embryo “due respect,” the state may also prevent its commodification by 
limiting compensation for gamete donations to minimum wage for time. Generally, society disagrees 
with commodifying embryos. Even IVF patients who donate their embryos to medical research prefer 
research toward fertility as opposed to research for patenting or commercial products.192  As discussed 
previously, high compensation for gamete donation imitates a transfer of property by sale.  Although law 
prohibits the buying and selling of embryos, the symbolic relationship between gametes and their 
embryonic product as well as the transfer of gametes for large sums of money result in commodifying 
both the gametes and the embryo.  Commodification manifests treatment of an embryo as mere property, 
not a potential person afforded due respect.  Hence, such commodification runs contrary to the potential 
personhood theory and the aims of a state adopting it.
Furthermore, financial incentives may lead to the objectification of live people.  Some private 
parties use financial incentives to generate children with socially desirable traits, effectually objectifying 
humans as opposed to recognizing their intrinsic value.193  Even the Ethics Committee of ASRM 
acknowledges the problem and recommends that patients be compensated for time and effort, not the 
number or quality of oocytes retrieved or the donor’s ethnic or personal characteristics.194  Hence, limiting 
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compensation to the minimum wage for one’s time and effort would likely reduce objectification of a 
potential person and result in a remainder of altruistic gamete donations.  
In addition, eradicating disproportionate compensation would reduce the risks to gamete donors.  
Instead of allowing the high compensation to cloud her judgment, a donor will more likely make an 
informed decision and completely consider the physical and psychological risks involved.  This effect 
will better protect women in a lower socio-economic bracket that remain more susceptible to the undue 
influence of excessive compensation.
While this reduction in compensation and limitation on embryo production would reduce the 
number of excess embryos that do not have an opportunity to implant, surplus embryos already in 
existence still remain a problem.  One practical solution would include the strong encouragement for 
couples to donate their surplus embryos to adoptive parents.  However, this retroactive application may 
violate the couple’s right to notice.  In which case, the government may decide to permit disposal of the 
embryo or even donate it to medical research under the theory that one may benefit from the use so long 
as she does not cause the harm.195  The United States and Germany have adopted such a theory to justify 
using ES cells that were extracted by means of destroying embryos.  Although the United States uses 
federal funds for ES cell research on cell lines produced prior August 2001, the government contents 
itself with the fact that it did not cause the destruction of the embryo but simply benefited from it.196
The state’s decision would depend on how heavily it gives credence to special respect due to the 
potential person.  Generally, when a woman has a born child that she no longer wants, she may not 
terminate the child but has the option of giving the child up for adoption.  However, in the interest of her 
bodily integrity, a woman may freely terminate a fetus before it reaches viability.197  Unlike the case of 
abortion, the continued development of a cryopreserved embryo does not infringe on the woman’s bodily 
integrity.  Hence, to remain consistent with the respect owed to a potential person, this logic would advise 
forced donation over destroying the embryo.  Though special respect of preserving a potential person’s 
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life would not outweigh another person’s right to bodily integrity, it would likely outweigh the right to 
notice, arguably a lesser right than a woman’s bodily integrity and an embryo’s entitlement to potential 
life.
Overall, the adoption for the person-oriented conception of embryos as potential persons would 
allow for the continued yet limited use of IVF.  While patients might still employ IVF to create life, the 
state would probably add protections for the embryo and its potential to develop into a live born 
offspring.  Possible regulations would include limiting the production of embryos to the number that the 
patient is willing to bear and ensuring the donation of any excess embryos to adoptive parents.  In 
addition, under the property-oriented understanding, the state would probably prohibit the destruction of 
embryos made prior to the enactment of such regulations and encourage the donation of such embryos to 
adoptive parents.  To decrease the commodification of human life, the state may even regulate the pay 
scheme for gamete donation, ensuring altruistic motivations and a continued distinction between 
humanity and property.
ii.  Embryonic Stem Cell Research
On the other hand, a state that accepts the property-oriented understanding of potential 
personhood would expectedly handle stem cell research in a more direct manner.  Instead of producing 
embryos to give them an opportunity to thrive, the use of embryos in stem cell research focuses on the 
cultivation of stem cells, which in many cases involves the destruction of an embryo and its potential for 
life.  As noted before, Congress originally banned the federal funding of human embryonic stem cell 
research.198  Today, the federal government funds stem cell research on a limited number of hES cell 
lines.199  However, scientists seek to expand their research to a more genetically diverse test group and to 
conduct tests on improved hES cells.  Such exploits require some form of stem cell extraction which 
commonly causes the destruction of human embryos from which the researcher removes the cells.
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Assuming a person-oriented conception of special respect for embryos, a state would generally 
show respect to an embryo by preserving its potential for life.  Depending on the type of procedure and its 
implications for the embryo’s capacity for life, such a state would go so far as to completely prohibit 
procedures that eliminate an embryo’s ability to develop into a live offspring.  Society already finds the 
deliberate creation of embryos for the purpose of destruction reprehensible.200  Still, a state adopting the 
person-oriented view of potential personhood would focus its concern, not on the reason for creation, but 
the impact that the procedure has on the embryo’s inherent ability to develop into a live born offspring.  
Whether or not the scientists created the embryos for stem cell research, the state that affords an embryo 
person-oriented respect would protect each embryo’s potential for life.
a.  Traditional ES Cell Culture
In traditional stem cell extractions from ordinary embryos, scientists culture the stem cells by 
removing the trophectoderm and effectually destroying the embryos capacity to develop.201  Since the 
person-oriented theory protects potential human life, it would prohibit the destruction of an embryo’s 
inherent capacity to develop into a live born offspring.  Although traditional stem cell extraction results in 
isolating stem cells, human ES cells alone cannot produce a live born offspring.202  Thus, the traditional 
extraction of stem cells from embryos would annihilate the embryo’s ability to mature into a fully viable 
person and prove impermissible under the person-oriented theory of special respect.  
Note, however, the use of stem cells alone does not violate the principle of protecting potential 
human life.  Stem cells by themselves lack the intrinsic ability to develop into a live person.203   Although 
hES cells may possibly produce an embryo if combined with a trophectoderm,204 alone they fail to 
naturally develop into a human being.  Rather, the potentiality that stem cells hold is somewhat akin to 
the capacity of a single gamete.  By itself, it cannot naturally grow into a person, but, if combined with 
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other necessary components, it may attain such potential by transforming into a human embryo.  Without 
an inherent capacity to become an actual person on its own, a stem cell is not a potential person due 
special respect.  On the other hand, a regular embryo used in traditional stem cell extraction has the innate
ability to mature into a viable person.  Hence, the embryo is a potential person.  While stem cells do not 
require special respect, an embryo may naturally develop into a live person , which warrants special 
consideration and protection of its capacity for life.  
As traditional stem cell extraction involves the destruction of an embryo and its ability to 
develop, some have asserted that scientists may protect an embryo’s potential life by extracting stem cells 
only from defective embryos.  Renowned stem cell researchers, Landry and Zucker, theorize about 
removing ICM from blastocysts declared dead from cleavage arrest with no chance of further 
development.205  However, such a distinction remains difficult to determine and impossible to perfectly 
identify.206  In fact, it would likely result in the accidental termination of an embryo capable of full 
development into a person.  With protection of the potential person in mind, person-oriented special 
respect would probably not allow for the sacrifice of a potential life but, like treatment of actual human 
life, take precautions to ensure that the potential life is preserved instead of sacrificed for efficiency and 
productivity.  Overall, a state that adopts a person-oriented understanding of potential personhood would 
likely ban traditional stem cell extraction altogether.
iii. Somatic Cell Nuclear Transfer
Similarly, stem cell extraction from SCNT embryoids would also terminate a potential person 
capable of developing into a live born offspring.207  An embryoid of SCNT undergoes similar cell division 
and development as that of a natural embryo.208  However, culturing ES cells from nuclear transfer 
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blastocysts requires removing the ICM from the trophectoderm, which destroys the embryoid.209 Because 
the procedure inhibits an embryoid’s inherent potential for life, the person-oriented theory would preclude 
SCNT for stem cell extraction.
On the other hand, some contend that the SCNT embryoids lack full potential for human life 
since they result in low birth success rates and abnormal offspring.  Although SCNT blastocysts may 
create live-born offspring like a natural embryo, SCNT embryoids have a low success rate for live birth 
and the resulting offspring often exhibit abnormalities.210  In a study of frogs by Byrne et al, tadpole 
SCNT embryoids rarely attained their full potential, specifically less than one percent of the embryoids
developed into actual tadpoles.211  Despite a low survival rate, this one percent success rate evidences that 
some embryoids resulting from SCNT will develop into live born human beings.  Unable to discern with 
complete certainty which will survive and which will not, special respect would give each embryoid an 
opportunity to thrive as a potential person.
As for arguments that abnormal offspring are not worth preserving, some assert that because an 
SCNT embryoid lacks the ability to develop into a “healthy human with acceptable efficiency,” it should 
be distinguished from a typical embryo.212  However, this distinction seems inadequate under the person-
oriented theory to justify viewing an SCNT embryoid as less than a potential person.  While SCNT 
embryoids and typical embryos share the potential to develop into live born offspring, both resulting 
offspring with disability or not share equal personhood. Therefore, we should not afford SCNT 
embryoids any lesser right than that afforded a traditional embryo.
Again, Landry and Zucker contend that researchers may determine the point at which the cell is 
unable to continue development by irreversible arrest of cell division and embryo death.213  However, 
irreversible arrest of cell division proves open to error since no definitive criteria exist.214  Hence, 
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depending on irreversible arrest of cell division may result in terminating an embryo that has the potential 
of developing into a live born human being.  As for embryonic death as a defining feature, some embryos 
that have been deemed “dead” have been able to maintain their developmental potential.215  Thus, 
irreversible arrest of cell division and organismic “death” fail to provide satisfactory evidence for an 
embryo’s loss of potential life.
Despite these various arguments for giving SCNT embyoids a lesser status than potential person 
or carefully selecting them for use in research, the embryoid’s inherent ability to develop into a live 
person, regardless of its quality and quantity, merits the embryoid’s status as a potential person.  In which 
case, the person-oriented theory of special respect would similarly preserve the potential lives of SCNT
embryoids, much like natural embryos.  Thus, a state adopting the person-oriented theory of special 
respect would likely ban stem cell extractions from these embryoids, since such a procedure robs the 
SCNT embryoid of its potential for human life.
While a ban on destroying SCNT embryoids in the process of culturing stem cells appears 
necessary to show the potential person special respect, we must next consider whether the mere 
production of SCNT embryoids would remain consistent with the person-oriented theory.  SCNT may 
serve purposes other than therapeutic cloning.  For instance, through reproductive cloning, SCNT makes 
it possible to create offspring that are genetically identical to the donor.  However, such use would still 
run contrary to the special respect due an SCNT embryoid and the preservation of human dignity, because 
“with larger numbers comes the possibility of declining regard.”216  The more replicas made; the less 
value an individual person will hold in society.  Society may even go so far as to consider a person 
expendable, since his exact genetic makeup lives on in another human body.  
Additionally, a ban on reproductive cloning will protect women who volunteer as surrogate 
mothers.  While ninety-nine percent of embryoid blastocysts fail, many give way in later stages, which 
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can harm the woman bearing the child in her womb.217  Banning SCNT altogether, including the 
production of embryoids for the purpose of creating a genetically identical offspring, would protect the 
interest of women volunteering their wombs for development.  Already acknowledging ethical concerns 
over reproductive cloning, Congress passed the Human Cloning Prohibition Act and has prohibited 
reproductive cloning of humans and subjects violators to prison or a fine.218
Remaining consistent with this Act, special respect for SCNT embryoids and preservation of 
human dignity would demand a complete ban on SCNT embryo production.  Because SCNT embryoids 
possess a capacity for human life, the person-oriented theory would entitle each embryoid to the chance at
developing into a live born offspring.  On the other hand, this would lead to reproductive cloning, which –
as we have determined - undermines special respect and human dignity.  Hence, SCNT embryoids have 
no legitimate purpose in a state adopting the person-oriented theory of special respect.  For this reason, 
such a state should entirely ban SCNT procedures.  
As for the already-existing embryoids, a person-oriented theory would have to choose between 
two “evils.”  While embryoids can serve practical purposes of stem cell cultivation and reproductive 
cloning, the person-oriented theory will not permit such uses.  The only other option would be to store the 
embryos in perpetuity.  Still, continuous storage fails to satisfy the principle of giving each potential 
person the opportunity to fulfill its potential for human life.  Hence, a state adopting the potential 
personhood theory would have to choose between using the embryoids in stem cell research or allowing 
reproductive cloning.  
While using embryoids in stem cell research could benefit society through medical advances, a 
person-oriented state would more likely focus its attention on the embryoid as a potential person.
Sticking with its central principle of protecting the embryoids’ potential for human life and giving it a 
reasonable opportunity to come to fruition, the state would most likely allow reproductive cloning in the 
case of pre-existing embryoids.  However, if reproductive cloning posed too great of a threat to the
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surrogate mother, the state might keep the embryo in storage to avoid harming the existing surrogate and 
to abstain from completely destroying the embryoid.  Still, where the surrogate mother willingly takes on 
the potential risks, the state might allow the embryoid’s implantation and development.  In all, the person-
oriented theory would generally result in a complete ban on SCNT with an exception for reproductive 
cloning in the case of pre-existing embryos.
iii.  Single Cell Biopsy of Eight-Cell Embryos
In an innovative technique of single cell biopsies, scientists have tried to overcome the ethical 
problems of stem cell extraction, yet even this new procedure may prove inconsistent with the person-
oriented theory of special respect.  In single cell biopsies, the eight-celled embryo from which the 
researcher extracts the single blastomere is a typical embryo capable of full development and live birth.  
After extraction, the remaining seven-celled embryo that is implanted in the womb typically develops into 
a live born baby.219  In contrast, the extracted blastomere is destroyed in the process of extracting stem 
cells.  
In assessing the legitimacy of single cell biopsies under the person-oriented view, we must first 
determine which cells, if any, constitute a potential person and next whether the extraction of stem cells 
violates the concept of special respect.  Clearly, the seven-celled embryo resulting from the procedure 
holds potential to develop into a live born offspring.  In fact, physicians conducting PGD commonly 
implant the seven cells into the uterus, which then successfully develop into a living baby.  Thus, the 
seven celled embryo is a potential person due special respect.  
On the other hand, the inherent ability of the blastomere remains highly disputed. One of the 
founding researchers, Dr. Lanza, contends that individual human blastomeres have “never been shown to 
create viable embryos.”220  Conversely, other scientists deem that a single human blastomere has the 
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ability to further divide into a fully functional blastocyst.221  In which case, the blastomere holds inherent 
potential to mature into an actual person and has a right to special respect as a potential person.  Amidst 
this debate, the status of the extracted blastomere as a potential person remains uncertain.
Next in considering the legitimacy of stem cell extraction from single cell biopsies, special 
respect under the person-oriented theory requires the protection of each entity’s potential for human life.  
As for the seven-celled embryo, stem cell extraction refrains from impeding the embryo’s ability to 
develop.  Rather, the embryo is implanted and often results in a live born offspring.  On the other hand, 
the cultivation of hES cells via single cell biopsies requires the manipulation of the removed blastomere.  
This process damages any ability that the blastomere may have held to develop into a live born offspring.  
If the blastomere by itself possesses inherent potential for human life, then the extraction of stem 
cells from the biopsied blastomere would violate the person-oriented theory.  Note this inherent potential 
does not require a high probability of occurrence, but simply calls for some prospect that a blastomere 
will grow into a live born offspring.  While not every blastomere will survive past birth, the person-
oriented theory may have an interest in protecting the single blastomere that can intrinsically survive and 
mature into an actualized person.  Since a researcher cannot differentiate the blastomere that will actualize 
into a born person and the blastomere that will not, protecting the potential person’s capacity for life 
would require a complete prohibition of the procedure.  Hence, if a state adopted the person-oriented 
understanding of special respect and a blastomere was shown to develop into a fully viable person, the 
state would likely bar the single cell biopsy method for stem cell extraction. This approach resonates with 
the sentiment that many approve of single cell biopsies as respectful of the potential life so long as the 
removed blastomere cannot inherently develop into an embryo and live offspring.222
Erring on the side of caution and showing the blastomere special respect, a state adopting the 
person-oriented theory may prohibit the single cell biopsy method for culturing hES cells even without 
direct evidence of a single blastomere developing to the point of viability.  While some may contend that 
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the probability of a single blastomere developing into a live born baby is so remote that it does not merit 
protection, the impact of the person-oriented theory depends not on the exactitude of probability, but 
instead on the possibility of human life.  To protect the blastomere’s potential for life; the person-oriented 
theory would preclude the practice of extracting stem cells from the blastomere, which destroys the cell 
and any capacity for human life.
An additional advantage to prohibiting single cell biopsies for hES cell cultures is decreased risk 
to the original embryo.223  Although some contend that a seven-celled embryo has virtually the same live 
birth success rate as an eight-celled embryo,224 blastomere extraction may put the original embryo at risk.  
While 2,000 babies have been born after extraction of a blastomere, the procedures may pose a risk of 
safety and long-term health on the embryo.225  Since the rate of ES cell cultures is 1 in 25 blastomeres, 
every one cell line puts 25 embryos at risk.226
Furthermore, a complete ban on the single cell biopsy method of cultivating stem cells would 
prevent an added demand for more stem cells.  Aside from the lack of special respect shown to the 
extracted blastomere, additional concern arises in the production of hES cells that remain necessary for 
the procedure.227  Since the procedure requires additional hES cells, cultivating stem cells by the single 
cell biopsy method creates a market for stem cells.  Initially, many of these hES cells will have to come 
from another source, and even after some time single cell biopsy stem cell cultivation may fail to produce 
sufficient stem cells needed for the procedure.  This would force researchers to look to other sources for 
stem cells and possibly encourage destruction of embryos or embryoids in other methods of stem cell 
extraction.  In effect, not relying on single cell biopsies may prevent a need for further embryonic
destruction.
Finally, culturing stem cells from eight-cell embryos fails to provide the needed diversity in hES 
cell lines.  Single cell biopsies only provide hES cell cultures that share their genetic makeup with current 
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or future embryos.228  The procedure lacks the capacity to produce stem cells that duplicate the genetics of 
an already existing person.229  As opposed to single cell biopsies, a method that produces stem cells 
genetically matching a living donor is more desirable as a therapeutic tool.  Hence, a state could resolve 
the problems posed in prohibiting single cell biopsies by offering an even better resource of stem cells 
that researchers can also use in therapy for already viable people.
v.  Alternative Nuclear Transfer (ANT)
As a solution, ANT offers a wide resource for stem cells that replicate the genetics of currently 
living people without extinguishing an embryoid’s intrinsic ability to mature into a live born offspring.
ANT embryoids inherently lack potential to develop into viable human babies.230  Still, they supply stem 
cells that serve as therapeutic tools in regenerative medicine. 231  Since hES cells from ANT embryoids are 
self-renewing and can be induced to differentiate into any tissue type, researchers may use them to study 
genetic illness and create methods to overcome tissue rejection.232  Not only do ANT embryoids offer 
therapeutic value for future people, but, by creating stem cells that duplicate the genetic makeup of fully 
viable humans, they also provide therapeutic value for already existing persons.  While society has a great 
interest in accumulating large banks of genetically diverse hES cells, ANT embryoids provide scientists 
an invaluable source of stem cells without impeding a potential person’s capacity for life.233
While the ANT embryoid cannot produce a live born offspring, it has no potential of becoming a 
person and thus retains no right to special respect. Hence, when ANT embryoids are dissected for 
purposes of extracting stem cells, the embryoid loses nothing.  Since the ANT embryoid fails to possess 
the innate potential for human life, it falls short of a potential person worthy of special respect.  Even if 
the ANT embryoid were presumed a potential person, it would still lack the innate potential for life that 
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special respect protects.  Hence, culturing hES cells from ANT embryoids remains consistent with the 
theory that embryos capable of producing live born offspring constitute potential persons worthy of 
special respect, i.e. protection of their potential lives.  In which case, a state taking on the person-oriented 
view would permit the extraction of stem cells from ANT embryoids.  
In regulating such extractions, the government should require consent from the nucleus donor.  
The Omnibus Reconciliation Act of 1986 allows doctors to approach a person’s next of kin for purposes 
of organ donation only after the individual has suffered brain death.234 Eric Cohen, an Ethics and Public 
Policy Center analyst in Washington D.C., calls ANT the “embryonic equivalent of brain death.”235 This 
is consistent with the fact that an ANT embryoid will not achieve viability and has no capacity for human 
life. Hence, it seems most appropriate that similar to cases of brain death the government require some 
consent from the donor or next of kin.  Though the embryoid is not a person or even a potential person, 
the nucleus donor would prove an appropriate decision-maker, either as the organ donor himself or the 
next of kin due to the donor’s genetic connection to the embryoid.  Therefore, requiring approval from the 
nucleus donor would prove reasonable in light of common organ donation practices.
While ANT offers a legitimate means of stem cell extraction within the person-oriented theory of 
special respect, some, including other members of the President’s Council on Bioethics, refuse to consider
the non-implantable product of ANT as constituting a nonviable artifact.236  Even so, unable to produce 
live born offspring, the ANT embryoid lacks potential personhood whether or not it constitutes a 
nonviable artifact.  Though the abnormality does not appear until the onset of cdx2 expression, the cell 
mass still remains inherently incapable of implantation, development, and live birth.237  Hence, under the 
theory that only potential persons merit special respect, ANT embryoids remain suitable for stem cell 
extraction.
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Although this alternative method for cultivating stem cells seems promising, scientists seek to use
other current stem cell extraction methods until ANT works on human cells.  Scientists contend that it is 
unwise and inefficient to create a complete moratorium on all other methods for culturing ES cells when 
ANT’s applicability to human ES cells hangs in the balance.238  Although this is an economic argument, it 
fails to take into consideration the importance of showing a potential person due respect.  While human 
dignity generally outweighs economic concerns, an embryo’s interest to special respect would likely 
outweigh the scientific community’s efficiency argument.  Like the importance of preserving a person’s 
fundamental rights outweighs economic efficiency, the concern of showing a potential person special 
respect outweighs mere convenience and prestige.  Since preserving human dignity far outweighs the 
prestigious benefit of leading the scientific community, we should not allow fear of being left behind to 
drive legislation.239  Theoretically, acceptance of a moratorium may even set a trend for other states and 
countries to follow.240
Beyond showing a potential person special respect, ANT also offers a reasonable compromise to 
the ethical debate over stem cell research, even in the Catholic Church.  Though some members argue that 
any non-therapeutic experimentation on embryos is illicit whether or not it compromises the embryoid’s 
life or integrity,241 others, such as Reverend Tacholczyk,242 call ANT “a step in the right direction.243  In 
August 2004, William Levada, one of the most prominent Catholics in the United States, wrote President 
Bush, encouraging consideration of ANT as a permissible method for culturing hES cells.244  Hence, 
permitting ANT stem cell extraction while prohibiting all other methods that impede an embryo’s natural 
ability to mature into a viable human being, a state may bring some satisfaction to the different interest 
groups involved in the ethical debate.
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Furthermore, once researchers extract stem cells from the ANT embryoid, the use of stem cells in 
therapeutic medicine does not contravene special respect for a potential person.  As noted before, stem 
cells alone cannot inherently implant in the uterus and grow into a live born offspring.  Like ANT 
embryoids, extracted stem cells are not potential persons, since they lack the inherent potential to develop 
into a viable human being.  Even if they did constitute potential persons, neither ANT embryoids nor stem 
cells have an inherent capacity for human life that special respect would protect.  In all, a state that adopts 
the person-oriented theory of potential personhood and special respect would likely approve stem cell 
extraction from ANT embryoids and the use of these stem cells in therapeutic medicine.
While stem cell derivation from ANT embryoids avoids impeding potential for human life, the 
procedure still requires oocyte donations.  To reduce commodification of human life, the state may 
employ legislation similar to that mentioned in our discussion of IVF.  For instance, the state might limit 
compensation for egg donors to the value of the donor’s time and effort.245  An appropriate valuation 
would likely reflect minimum wage.  By regulating financial solicitation for gamete donation, the state 
would prevent commodification of gametes, embryos, and human life.  
Such legislation would also reduce continuing risks to oocyte donors.  Instead of disregarding the 
risks of oocyte donation, donors would prove more inclined to weighing the dangers before agreeing to 
donation.  This especially protects the interest of the economically challenged woman who might be 
unduly influenced by high compensation.  Overall, though ANT perpetuates the continual need for oocyte 
donation, it still allows stem cell extraction without disrespecting a potential person and, with some 
regulation of financial solicitation, minimizes the harm to gamete donors.
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CONCLUSION
In conclusion, the status of embryos has been highly disputed as person or property, but a middle 
ground approach of potential personhood proves to be a more appropriate characterization of embryos.  
With the concept of potential personhood, comes treating embryos with special respect.  This special 
respect may range from property-oriented treatment that limits an owner’s property rights to person-
oriented treatment that preserves the embryo’s capacity for life.  Within this spectrum of interpreting 
special respect, societal conceptions of embryos and the interest of human dignity supports an approach 
more person-oriented than property-oriented.
If a state were to adopt potential personhood and a person-oriented understanding of special 
respect, this characterization of embryos would have a profound effect on medical procedures that require 
the use of embryos.  Still, it would allow for a regulated use of in vitro fertilization and stem cell research.  
While defining special respect in a person-oriented manner requires protection of a potential person’s 
capacity to develop into a live born offspring, such respect still permits use that does not destroy potential 
human life.  So long as IVF patients limit the number of embryos produced to the number they desire to 
bear and make alternative plans of adoption for those they choose not to implant, IVF effectively 
preserves the embryo’s inherent potential for life.  
On the other hand, stem cell extraction methods may prove more problematic.  The extraction of 
stem cells from regular embryos and SCNT embryoids eliminates the potential person’s capacity to 
mature into an actual person.  Thus, the person-oriented understanding of special respect would preclude 
such extractions.  Similarly, taking stem cells from a single blastomere of an eight-celled embryo destroys 
any pre-existing capacity for human life that the blastomere held, which means special respect would 
likely prohibit this method. Still, in the end, ANT embryoids cannot create fully viable human beings in
their natural development.  Without the requisite potential for human life, ANT embryoids are not 
potential persons worthy of special respect.  Therefore, researchers may freely destroy ANT embryoids 
without failing to protect potential human life.
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While a state that classifies an embryo as a potential person would still permit IVF and ANT stem 
cell extraction, the state may additionally regulate financial solicitation for gamete donations.  Though 
gametes lack potential personhood, they closely relate to humanity as the basic components of human life.  
By restricting compensation, states prevent commodification of humans and reduce the harm to oocyte 
donors.  In all, by closely regulating the use of embryos and gamete donation, a state may preserve human 
dignity and still allow IVF and stem cell research without extinguishing a potential person’s capacity to 
develop into a live born offspring.
